000			02012nam a22002777a 4500
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008			240305b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a00222186
040			_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda
050			_aHB73 JOU
100	1		_aHanssen, F. Andrew _eauthor
245	1	0	_aVertical integration during the hollywood studio era _cby F. Andrew Hanssen
264			_aChicago: _bUniversity of Chicago Press; _c2010.
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aJournal of law and economics _vVolume 53, number 3
520			_aThe Hollywood studio system—production, distribution, and exhibition vertically integrated—flourished until 1948, when the famous Paramount decision forced the divestiture of theater chains and the abandonment of a number of vertical practices. Although many of the banned practices have since been posited to have increased efficiency, evidence of an efficiency-enhancing rationale for theater ownership has not been presented. This paper explores the hypothesis that theater chain ownership promoted efficient ex post adjustment in the length of film runs—specifically, abbreviation of unexpectedly unpopular films. Extracontractual run-length adjustments are desirable because demand for a film is not revealed until the film is actually exhibited. The paper employs a unique data set of cinema booking sheets. It finds that run lengths for releases by vertically integrated film producers were significantly—economically and statistically—more likely to be altered ex post. The paper documents and discusses additional practices intended to promote flexibility
650			_aDefendants _vEntertainment industries _xFilm prints
650			_aFilm producers _vMotion picture industry _xMovies
650			_aPalaces _vProduction costs _xTrade shows
650			_aVertical integration
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1086/605567
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c164089 _d164089