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008			240305b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a00222186
040			_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda
050			_aHB73 JOU
100	1		_aCiliberto, Federico _eauthor
245	1	0	_aLimited access to airport facilities and market power in the airline industry _cby Federico Ciliberto and Jonathan W. Williams
264			_aChicago: _bUniversity of Chicago Press; _c2010.
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aJournal of law and economics _vVolume 53, number 3
520			_aWe investigate the role of limited access to airport facilities as a determinant of the hub premium in the U.S. airline industry. We use original data from competition plans that airports are required to submit to the U.S. Department of Transportation in compliance with the Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the Twenty-First Century. We collect information on the availability and control of airport gates, leasing arrangements, and other restrictions limiting the expansion of airport facilities. We find that the hub premium is increasing in the ticket fare. We find that control of gates is a crucial determinant of this premium. Limits on the fees that airlines can charge for subleasing their gates lower the prices charged by airlines. Finally, control of gates and restrictions on sublease fees explain high fares only when there is a scarcity of gates relative to the number of departures from an airport
650			_aAirlines _vAirport access _xAirports
650			_aBarriers to entry _vCivil aviation _xFees
650			_aLeases _vPassengers _yPrice premiums
650			_aSubleases
700			_aWilliams, Jonathan W. _eco author
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1086/605725
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c164086 _d164086