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008			240304b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a00222186
040			_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda
050			_aHB73 JOU
100	1		_aCollins, Sean M. _eauthor
245	1	0	_aHoldout: _bexistence, information, and contingent contracting _cby Sean M. Collins and R. Mark Isaac
264			_aChicago: _bUniversity of Chicago Press; _c2012.
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aJournal of law and economics _vVolume 55, number 4
520			_aThe holdout problem permeates policy discussions of legal issues involving bargaining for land acquisition and more broadly impacts multilateral bargaining between agents. Laboratory experiments investigate the scope of the holdout problem. The research strategy incorporates as treatment variables available information and the exposure problem arising from the unavailability of contingent contracts. An examination reveals that holdout can reliably produce large inefficiencies and lost opportunities for mutually advantageous trade. The introduction of contingent contracts facilitates successful bargaining. However, buyers are not made significantly better off by contingent contracts.
650			_aUncertainty _xAsymmetric information
650			_aPrivate information _xContingent delivery
650			_aRadner equilibrium
700			_aIsaac, R. Mark _eco author
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1086/665830
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c164071 _d164071