000			01989nam a22002897a 4500
003			ZW-GwMSU
005			20240301130235.0
008			240301b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a00222186
040			_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda
050			_aHB73 JOU
100	1		_aAivazian, Varouj A. _eauthor
245	1	0	_aExperimental tests of core theory and the coase theorem: _binefficiency and cycling _cby Varouj A. Aivazian, Jeffrey L. Callen and Susan McCracken
264			_aChicago: _bUniversity of Chicago Press; _c2009.
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aJournal of law and economics _vVolume 52, number 4,
520			_aWe examine experimentally the bargaining process and the final allocation of payoffs in games that differ in terms of whether the core exists and in the initial allocation of property rights among the players. This paper highlights the interaction among property rights, transaction costs, and the empty core. Our experimental results indicate that the existence of the core is an important determinant of bargaining generally and the Coase theorem in particular. They confirm our conjecture that when the core is empty and property rights are ill defined, Coasean efficiency breaks down. Among other results, our experiments show that the number of inefficient (non‐Pareto‐optimal) agreements and bargaining rounds with cycling are significantly greater when the core is empty than when the core exists, especially when property rights are ill defined. Our results suggest an economic role for specific property right arrangements to resolve the empty core
650			_aBargaining _xBargaining theory
650			_aCoalition bargaining _xCoase theorem
650			_aExperimentation _xLinear regression
700			_aCallen, Jeffrey L. _eco author
700			_aMcCracken, Susan _eco author
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1086/596562
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c164044 _d164044