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022			_a00222186
040			_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda
050			_aHB73 JOU
100	1		_aKaffine, Daniel T. _eauthor
245	1	0	_aQuality and the commons: The surf gangs of California _cby Daniel T. Kaffine
264			_aChicago: _bUniversity of Chicago Press; _c2009.
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aJournal of law and economics _vVolume 52, number 4,
520			_aIn open‐access settings, high‐quality resources are lucrative, yet fencing out potential entrants may be very costly. I examine the endogenous creation of property rights, focusing on the incentives that resource quality provides to close the commons. Analytical examples explore the incentives of locals to increase or decrease the strength of property rights conditional on how locals and nonlocals value the quality of the resource. The empirical analysis looks at a unique resource—surf breaks—and estimates the relationship between the exogenous quality of the resource (waves at the surf break) and local attempts to seize the common surf break. Using cross‐sectional data on 86 surf breaks along the southern California coast, this paper finds that a 10 percent increase in quality leads to a 7-17 percent increase in the strength of property rights
650			_aFishery resources _xInformal property rights
650			_aResource ownership _xSurfing
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1086/605293
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c164036 _d164036