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003			ZW-GwMSU
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008			240301b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a00222186
040			_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda
050			_aHB73 JOU
100	1		_aHelland, Eric A. _eauthor
245	1	0	_aProduct liability and moral hazard: _bevidence from general aviation _cby Eric A. Helland and Alexander Tabarrok
264			_aChicago _bUniversity of Chicago Press _c2012
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aJournal of law and economics _vVolume 55, number 3,
520			_aAbstract Product liability law reduces the costs of accidents to consumers, thus reducing their incentives to invest in safety. We estimate the impact of tort liability on a subset of consumers who have significant control over the probability of an accident: the consumers of general aviation aircraft. The General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 exempted manufacturers of small aircraft from product liability claims when their aircraft reached 18 years of age. We use the exemption at age 18 to estimate the impact of tort liability on accidents as well as on a wide variety of behaviors and safety investments by pilots and owners. The results are consistent with moral hazard. When an aircraft is exempted from tort liability, the probability that the aircraft will be involved in an accident declines. Direct evidence of pilots’ and owners’ behavior is also consistent with moral hazard
650			_aAircraft accidents _xGeneral aviation
650			_aAccidents _xAircraft
700			_aTabarrok, Alexander _eco author
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1086/666363
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c164016 _d164016