| 000 | 01641nam a22002537a 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 003 | ZW-GwMSU | ||
| 005 | 20240301064432.0 | ||
| 008 | 240301b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d | ||
| 022 | _a0022-2186 | ||
| 040 |
_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda |
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| 050 | _aHB73 JOU | ||
| 100 | 1 |
_aBoylan, Richard T. _eauthor |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 |
_aThe effect of punishment severity on plea bargaining _cby Richard T. Boylan |
| 264 |
_aChicago _bUniversity of Chicago Press _c2012 |
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| 336 |
_2rdacontent _atext _btxt |
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| 337 |
_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn |
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| 338 |
_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc |
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| 440 |
_aJournal of law and economics _vVolume55 , number 3 |
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| 520 | _aAbstract This study examines whether criminal suspects facing more severe punishments are more likely to go to trial. Sample selection makes it difficult to obtain valid proxies for severity; for instance, I expect severity to be positively related to the prosecutor’s decision to indict, to indict in federal court (versus state court), and to try the suspect. Theoretical and empirical findings indicate that in samples containing only indicted, convicted, or tried suspects, reasonable proxies for severity may be negatively related to actual severity. The assignment of defendants to judges randomizes the severity of punishment in a manner that is unrelated to sample selection. Thus, by examining the effect of these assignments, I find that a 10-month increase in prison sentences raises trial rates by 1 percentage point. | ||
| 650 |
_aCourthouses _xCriminal sentencing |
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| 650 |
_aDefendants _xEmpirical evidence |
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| 856 | _uhttps://doi.org/10.1086/663588 | ||
| 942 |
_2lcc _cJA |
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| 999 |
_c164015 _d164015 |
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