000			01928nam a22002537a 4500
003			ZW-GwMSU
005			20240229141656.0
008			240229b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a0022-2186
040			_aMSU _bEnglish language _cMSU _erda
050			_aHB73 JOU
100			_aKanwar, Sunil _eauthor
245	1	0	_aIntellectual property protection and technology licensing: _bthe case of developing countries _cby Sunil Kanwar
264			_aChicago _bUniversity of Chicago Press _c2012
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aJournal of law and economics _vVolume 55, number 3
520			_aAbstract This paper studies the influence of stronger patent protection on technology licensing. Using data for the post-Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) period and focusing on developing countries, I correct for any endogeneity biases that may bedevil estimation. Employing a more inclusive index of patent protection than hitherto, which better accounts for the enforcement and implementation environment, I find that stronger protection is associated with increased royalty and license fee payments, which implies greater technology transfer to developing countries. The significance of the protection variable is driven by the subindex of patent coverage, which makes eminent sense in view of the increase in the coverage of patentable matter by developing countries after TRIPS. The economic significance of the protection variable is also substantial, with ceteris paribus changes in this variable accounting for technology inflows of U.S.$2.5-$3.2 billion (base year 2000) in the post-TRIPS sample period
650			_aDeveloping countries _xEmerging technology
650			_aIntellectual property law _zDeveloping countries
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1086/665566
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c164012 _d164012