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| 003 | ZW-GwMSU | ||
| 005 | 20240229131101.0 | ||
| 008 | 240229b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d | ||
| 040 |
_aMSU _bEnglish language _cMSU _erda |
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| 050 | _aHB73 JOU | ||
| 245 | 1 |
_aInternational politics and import diversification _cby Sergey Mityakov, Heiwai Tang and Kevin K. Tsui |
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| 264 |
_aChicago _bUniversity of Chicago Press _c2013 |
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| 336 |
_2rdacontent _atext _btxt |
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| 337 |
_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn |
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| 338 |
_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc |
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| 440 |
_aThe journal of law and economics _vVolume 56, number 4 |
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| 520 | _aAbstract This paper examines how international politics affects trade in the absence of empires or wars. We first show that deterioration of relations between the United States and another country, measured by divergence in their United Nations General Assembly voting patterns, reduced U.S. imports from that country during 1962-2000. Though statistically significant, the magnitude of the effect of political distance on trade is small. Indeed, we show that except for petroleum and some chemical products, U.S. imports are not affected by international politics. American firms, however, diversify their oil imports significantly away from political opponents of the United States. Oil trade is often associated with backward vertical foreign direct investment that is subject to the expropriation risk. In contrast to the usual claim that oil is a strategic commodity, we provide suggestive evidence that trade in products when rents are appropriable is more likely to be affected by international politics | ||
| 650 |
_aCountries _xDemocracy |
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| 650 |
_aExpropriation _xImports |
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| 650 |
_aInternational politics _xInternational trade |
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| 700 |
_aTang, Heiwai _eco author |
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| 700 |
_aTsui, Kevin K. _eco author |
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| 856 | _uhttps://doi.org/10.1086/674132 | ||
| 942 |
_2lcc _cJA |
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_c164000 _d164000 |
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