000			01525nam a22002417a 4500
003			ZW-GwMSU
005			20240229125757.0
008			240229b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aMSU _bEnglish language _cMSU _erda
050			_aHB73 JOU
100			_aGerlach, Heiko _eauthor
245			_aSelf reporting, investigation and evidentiary standards _cby Heiko Gerlach
264			_aChicago _bUniversity of Chicago University _c2013
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aThe journal of law and economics _vVolume 56, number 4
520			_aAbstract Self-reporting schemes have become a substantial part of law enforcement. This paper analyzes the optimal use of such schemes when the authority cannot commit to an ex post investigation effort. I show that this leads to a negative relationship between self-reporting incentives and investigation effort. Three main conclusions arise. First, violators self-report with a probability of 1 if and only if full amnesty is offered. Second, self-reporting schemes are not efficient when the level of harm of the act is high. Finally, authorities can increase the incentives to self-report when they convict without hard evidence. However, a hard-evidence standard provides more deterrence and is weakly welfare superior
650			_aAmnesty _xBehavior deterrence _zCartels
650			_aMarginal costs _xOptimal policy
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1086/674098
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c163996 _d163996