| 000 | 01551nam a22002777a 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 003 | ZW-GwMSU | ||
| 005 | 20240229100426.0 | ||
| 008 | 240229b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d | ||
| 022 | _a00222186 | ||
| 040 |
_aMSU _bEnglish langauge _cMSU _erda |
||
| 050 | _aHB73 JOU | ||
| 100 | 1 |
_aChen, Zhijun _eauthor |
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| 245 |
_aOn the design of leniency programs _cby Zhijun Chen and Patrick Rey |
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| 264 |
_aChicago _bUniversity of Chicago Press _c2013 |
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| 336 |
_2rdacontent _atext _btxt |
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| 337 |
_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn |
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| 338 |
_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc |
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| 440 |
_aThe journal of law and economics _vVolume , number , |
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| 520 | _aLeniency programs contribute to destabilizing collusion but can also be abused and generate perverse effects. This paper develops a simple model capturing this trade-off, which we use to relate the optimal leniency policy (the carrot) to the effectiveness of investigations (the stick). We show that it is always desirable to offer some leniency before an investigation is launched; it is also optimal to offer some leniency once an investigation is underway when investigations are unlikely to succeed in uncovering cartels, absent self-reporting. Our analysis also confirms the usefulness of restricting leniency to the first informant only; in contrast, it does not support prohibiting leniency for repeat offenders. | ||
| 650 | _aCartel | ||
| 650 | _aLeniency Program | ||
| 650 | _aAntitrust | ||
| 700 |
_aRey, Patrick _eco author |
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| 856 | _uhttps://doi.org/10.1086/674011 | ||
| 942 |
_2lcc _cJA |
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| 999 |
_c163970 _d163970 |
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