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| 003 | ZW-GwMSU | ||
| 005 | 20240301092635.0 | ||
| 008 | 240228b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d | ||
| 022 | _a00222186 | ||
| 040 |
_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda |
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| 050 | _aHB73 JOU | ||
| 100 | 1 |
_aRevelli, Federico _eauthor |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 |
_aTax mix corners and other kinks _cby Federico Revelli |
| 264 |
_aChicago : _bUniversity of Chicago Press ; _c2013. |
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| 336 |
_2rdacontent _atext _btxt |
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| 337 |
_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn |
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| 338 |
_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc |
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| 440 |
_aThe journal of law and economics _vVolume 56 , number 3 |
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| 520 | _aThis paper models the local tax mix determination process in the presence of statewide fiscal limitations—the decentralized government finance archetype—and shows how excess sensitivity of local public spending to grants (the conventionally and somewhat misleadingly termed “flypaper effect”) arises in the constrained tax mix irrespective of whether lower or upper limits bind and how it cannot, in general, be taken as a symptom of local government overspending. An empirical application to Italian province panel data provides consistent evidence of the role of corner solutions produced by two-sided tax limits in explaining the sensitivity of local public expenditures to grants. | ||
| 650 |
_aTax _xTaxation |
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| 856 | _uhttps://doi.org/10.1086/671479 | ||
| 942 |
_2lcc _cJA |
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| 999 |
_c163915 _d163915 |
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