| 000 | 01474nam a22002537a 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 003 | ZW-GwMSU | ||
| 005 | 20240228100534.0 | ||
| 008 | 240228b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d | ||
| 040 |
_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda |
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| 050 | _aHB73 JOU | ||
| 100 | 1 |
_aDyck, Alexander _eauthor |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 |
_aMedia versus special interests _cby Alexander Dyck, David Moss and Luigi Zingales |
| 264 |
_aChicago: _bUniversity of Chicago Press; _c2013. |
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| 336 |
_2rdacontent _atext _btxt |
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| 337 |
_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn |
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| 338 |
_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc |
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| 440 |
_aThe Journal of Law and Economics _vVolume 56, number 3 |
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| 520 | _aWe argue that profit-maximizing media help to overcome the rational ignorance problem highlighted by Anthony Downs. By collecting news and combining it with entertainment, media are able to inform passive voters about regulation and other public policy issues, acting as a (partial) counterbalance to small but well-organized groups. To show the impact this information has on regulation, we document the effect muckraking magazines had on the voting patterns of U.S. representatives and senators on regulatory issues in the early part of the twentieth century. We also discuss the conditions under which media can serve to counterbalance special interests. | ||
| 650 |
_aMedia _xPublic policy |
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| 700 | 1 |
_aMoss, David _eco-author |
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| 700 | 1 |
_aZingales, Luigi _eco-author |
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| 856 | _uhttps://doi.org/10.1086/673216 | ||
| 942 |
_2lcc _cJA |
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| 999 |
_c163888 _d163888 |
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