000			01775nam a22002417a 4500
003			ZW-GwMSU
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008			231121b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aMSU _cMSU _erda
100	1		_aSon, Myungsoo _eauthor
245	0	0	_aEarnings announcement timing and analyst following _cby Myungsoo Son and Aaron D. Crabtree
264			_aThousand Okas, CA: _bSage Publications; _c2011.
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aThe Vincent C. Ross Institute of Accounting Research _vVolume , number ,
520			_aUsing a large sample of firms in the post–Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) era, we examine the cross-sectional association between earnings announcement timing and analyst following that precedes it—that is, potential competing information. We fail to find a positive association between earnings announcement delay and preceding analyst following, as would be expected if the two were substitutes. Our findings of a negative association suggest that firms with large analyst following tend to announce annual earnings earlier than others. Furthermore, when we investigate the tendency of analysts to follow firms, a negative association exists in the regression of analyst following on prior earnings announcement delay, suggesting that analysts are more likely to follow firms that report earnings early. Collectively, managers’ earnings announcement timing and analyst following are not a substitutive relation, but rather a complementary one.
650			_aEarnings announcement delay
650			_aAnalyst following
700	1		_aCrabtree, Aaron D. _eauthor
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1177/0148558X11401223
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c163499 _d163499