000			01578nam a22002657a 4500
003			ZW-GwMSU
005			20231121125125.0
008			231121b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aMSU _cMSU _erda
100	1		_aCheng Qiang _eauthor
245	0	0	_aEquity incentives and earnings management : _bevidence from the banking industry _cby Qiang Cheng, Terry Warfield and Minlei Ye
264			_aThousand Oaks, CA: _bSage Publications; _c2011.
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aThe Vincent C. Ross Institute of Accounting Research _vVolume 26, number 2,
520			_aWe examine the relationship between equity incentives and earnings management in the banking industry. By focusing on this regulated industry and using industry-specific earnings management proxies, we provide evidence on the impact of regulation on earnings management arising from chief executive officers’ equity incentives. We find that bank managers with high equity incentives are more likely to manage earnings, but only when capital ratios are closer to the minimums required by regulators. This finding indicates that, in the banking industry, potential regulatory intervention induces, rather than mitigates, earnings management arising from equity incentives.
650			_aEquity incentives
650			_aEarnings management
650			_aBanking
700	1		_aWarfield, Terry _eauthor
700	1		_aYe, Minlei _eauthor
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1177/0148558X11401219
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c163493 _d163493