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008			231121b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aMSU _cMSU _erda
100	1		_aHossain, Mahmud _eauthor
245	0	0	_aCorporate governance and earnings management in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act regimes : _bevidence from implicated option backdating firms _cby Mahmud Hossain, Santanu Mitra, Zabihollah Rezae and Bharat Sarath
264			_aThousand Oaks CA: _bSage Publ;ications; _c2011.
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aThe Vincent C. Ross Institute of Accounting and Finance _vVolume 26, number 2,
520			_aBackdating stock options, a practice that retroactively adjusts stock option grant dates to lower the exercise price, has raised governance, legal, accounting, tax, and auditing concerns. The practice of backdating options generally is believed to be a result of both ineffective corporate governance and management opportunism. Both of these factors have been linked to a higher level of discretionary accruals adjustments. This study examines the accruals-based earnings management patterns for a group of firms that were implicated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for backdating stock options with a matched control group of nonimplicated firms for a time period surrounding the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. Both the univariate and multivariate analyses show that in the pre-SOX years, the sample of implicated firms managed abnormal accruals at a significantly greater level than the matched group of nonimplicated firms. The differential pattern of accruals management across these two groups becomes insignificant in the post-SOX period. Our result also suggests that the effect of SOX on mitigating the level of accruals management is substantially greater for the implicated companies than for the nonimplicated companies. The difference in the effect of SOX on the two groups of firms persists even after controlling for the differences in their governance and internal control effectiveness. We, therefore, suggest that SOX had effects on management’s reporting choices beyond those resulting from improvements in governance and internal control over financial reporting.
650			_aCorporate governance
650			_aSarbanes-Oxley Act
650			_aAccruals-Based Earnings Management
700	1		_aMitra, Santanu _eauthor
700	1		_aRezaee, Zabihollah _eauthor
700	1		_aSarath, Bharat _eauthor
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1177/0148558X114012
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c163491 _d163491