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040 _aMSU
_cMSU
_erda
100 _aBEVERLEY, Eric Lewis
245 _aFrontier as Resource
_bLaw, Crime, and Sovereignty on the Margins of Empire
264 _aCambridge
_bCambridge Unioversity Press
_c2013
336 _2rdacontent
_atext
_btxt
337 _2rdamedia
_aunmediated
_bn
338 _2rdacarrier
_avolume
_bnc
440 _aComparative Studies in Society and History
_vVolume , number ,
520 _aNineteenth-century European colonialism produced a textured and uneven legal terrain rather than homogeneous imperial units. The fragmentation of sovereignty between empires and subordinated states created frontier zones that unsettled the workings of governance. This article views the developing landscape of power in high colonial South Asia from the loosely controlled frontier zone between Hyderabad, a Princely State ruled by sovereign Muslim dynasts titled Nizams, and the Bombay Presidency, part of Britain's Indian Empire, or Raj. I argue that the heterogeneous legal terrain along the border was a useful resource for administrators and subjects. State officials of both Hyderabad and Bombay justified various projects there; subjects of the two states shopped forums in a legal pluralist environment; and populations on either side of the border whose livelihoods and political agendas ran afoul of social pressures or the economic and cultural imperatives of state projects fled there from adversity. I examine cases of alleged cattle rustlers, bandits, and prostitutes and their engagements with police and courts to explore the political challenges and possibilities the frontier offered different groups. Colonial attempts to extend racialized policing practices across the frontier were frequently met by machinations of marginal people trying to avoid imprisonment or extricate themselves from oppressive social structures. Such figures could use the ambiguity of frontier legal authority to their advantage. The picture that emerges is one of a brute and often-arbitrary colonial power offset by alternative malleable sovereignties that resourceful subjects could play against one another.
650 _alaw
650 _acrime
650 _asovereignty
856 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417513000029
942 _2lcc
_cJA
999 _c163364
_d163364