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040			_aMSU _cMSU _erda
100			_aCHINTRAKARN, P
245			_aHow do entrenched boards reduce human rights violations? An empirical analysis
264			_aNew York _bTaylor & Francis _c2013
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aApplied Economics Letters _vVolume , number ,
520			_aAs part of corporate social responsibility, companies invest in activities that promote human rights or refrain from activities that violate human rights. Investments in human rights, however, usually do not yield immediate benefits. Rather, they are expected to improve the reputation of the firm over time as a good corporate citizen. As one of the most effective takeover defences, a staggered board insulates managers from the takeover market. Secured in their positions, managers are less likely to be myopic and are more likely to adopt policies that yield long-term benefits, such as investments in human rights. Consistent with this notion, our results show that firms with a staggered board exhibit much better human rights performance. We also show that our results are not likely driven by endogeneity.
650			_astaggered boards
650			_aclassified boards
650			_amanagerial entrenchment
700			_aCHATJUTHAMARD, P
700			_aJIRAPORN, P
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2013.797553
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c163321 _d163321