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| 003 | ZW-GwMSU | ||
| 005 | 20230919101015.0 | ||
| 008 | 230919b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d | ||
| 040 |
_aMSU _cMSU _erda |
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| 100 | _aBOS, Iwan | ||
| 245 | _aA note on cartel ringleaders and the corporate leniency programme | ||
| 264 |
_aNew York _bTaylor & Francis _c2013 |
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| 336 |
_2rdacontent _atext _btxt |
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| 337 |
_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn |
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| 338 |
_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc |
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| 440 |
_aApplied Economics Letters _vVolume , number , |
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| 520 | _aCartel ringleaders can apply for amnesty in some jurisdictions (e.g., the EU), whereas in others they are excluded (e.g., the US). This note shows that ringleader exclusion loosens the incentive constraint of regular cartel members and tightens or loosens the incentive constraint of ringleaders. The latter may occur when the first firm that applies for leniency receives a sufficiently high discount. | ||
| 650 | _acartels | ||
| 650 | _aleniency programme | ||
| 650 | _aringleader | ||
| 700 | _aWANDSCHNEIDER, Frederick | ||
| 856 | _uhttps://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2013.788777 | ||
| 942 |
_2lcc _cJA |
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| 999 |
_c163307 _d163307 |
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