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003			ZW-GwMSU
005			20230912102630.0
008			230912b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aMSU _cMSU _erda
100			_aKUMAKAWA, Takehisa
245			_aEvaluating others’ behaviour _ba public-good experiment with ex-post communication
264			_aNew York _bTaylor & Francis _c2013
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aApplied Economics Letters _vVolume , number ,
520			_aThe present study investigates the effect of ex-post communication on the voluntary provision of public goods. The experiment consists of two stages. In the first stage, paired subjects play a standard public-good game; in the second, each of them evaluates his or her partner’s contribution in the first stage and sends a free-form written message to him or her. The experimental results show that the mere presence of an opportunity for ex-post communication is not enough to promote cooperation. However, once subjects actually receive negative messages, they contribute significantly more in the following round. Positive messages, by contrast, do not have such an effect.
650			_apublic good experiment
650			_aex - post communication
650			_aevaluate
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2013.829178
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c163230 _d163230