| 000 | 01220nam a22002657a 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 003 | ZW-GwMSU | ||
| 005 | 20240430141130.0 | ||
| 008 | 230908b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d | ||
| 022 | _a13504851 | ||
| 040 |
_aMSU _cMSU _erda _bEnglish |
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| 050 | 0 | 0 | _aHB1.A666 APP |
| 100 | 1 |
_aBos Iwan _eauthor |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 |
_aDo antitrust agencies facilitate meetings in smoke-filled rooms? _ccreated by Iwan Bos , Ronald Peeters and Erik Pot |
| 264 | 1 |
_aNew York: _bTaylor and Francis, _c2013 |
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| 336 |
_2rdacontent _atext _btxt |
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| 337 |
_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn |
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| 338 |
_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc |
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| 440 |
_aApplied economics letters _vVolume 20, number 5 |
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| 520 | 3 | _aThis article identifies a potential adverse effect of antitrust enforcement. We show that if tacit collusion is not sustainable, firms are able and willing to collude explicitly when demand is viscous, the expected antitrust penalty is limited and antitrust agencies are sufficiently effective in catching cartels. | |
| 650 |
_aTacit collusion _vExplicit collusion _xAntitrust enforcement |
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| 700 | 1 |
_aPeeters Ronald _eco-author |
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| 700 | 1 |
_aPot Erik _eco-author |
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| 856 | _uhttps://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2012.725925 | ||
| 942 |
_2lcc _cJA |
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| 999 |
_c163210 _d163210 |
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