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022			_a13504851
040			_aMSU _cMSU _erda _bEnglish
050	0	0	_aHB1.A666 APP
100	1		_aLillard, Dean R _eauthor
245	1	0	_aJust passing through: _bthe effect of the Master Settlement Agreement on estimated cigarette tax price pass-through/ _ccreated by Dean R. Lillard and Andrew Sfekas
264	1		_aNew York: _bTaylor and Francis, _c2013.
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aApplied Economics Letters _vVolume 20, number 4
520	3		_aIn 1998, cigarette manufacturers and state attorneys general in the United States settled a group of lawsuits in an agreement known as the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA). Among the provisions of this agreement were a set of mandated escrow payments to the states that would be based on cigarette sales. The result of these provisions is that the apparent relationship between taxes and prices changed substantially following implementation of the MSA. This article estimates whether the MSA escrow amounts are reflected in prices and compares the pass-through rate of state and federal cigarette taxes only and the rate when one adds escrow payments. We find much different pass-through rates for the two measures. State and federal taxes are not fully passed to smokers. In years that escrow payments were made, cigarette prices increased by more than the sum of the state and federal taxes and the escrow payments.
650			_aMaster settlement agreement _vCigarette tax _xTax elasticity
700	1		_aSfekas, Andrew _eco author
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2012.705422
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c162928 _d162928