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008			230704b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aMSU _cMSU _erda
100			_aKWON, Iloong
245			_aRisk-taking in subjective promotion tournaments
264			_aNew York _bTaylor & Springer _c2013
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aApplied Economics Letters _vVolume , number ,
520			_aThis article considers a promotion tournament where the winner is decided by the principal's posterior belief about the agents’ abilities, called a subjective promotion tournament. If the agents can choose the risk of their performance as well as their effort, this article shows that such a subjective tournament can be better than an objective tournament where the winner is decided by the agents’ verifiable performance measures only. This is because the subjective tournament leads to lower uncertainty about the agents’ abilities and a higher level of agents’ effort, thereby providing better sorting and incentive effects.
650			_apromotion tournament
650			_asubjective performance evaluation
650			_achoice of risk
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2013.802081
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c162872 _d162872