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040			_aMSU _cMSU _erda _bEnglish
050	0	0	_aHB1.A666 APP
100	1		_aLin, Yi - Mien _eauthor
245	1	0	_aFinancing policy, executive stock options and cash flow forecasts/ _ccreated by Yi-Mien Lin, Woody M. Liao and Yen-Yu Liu
264	1		_aNew York: _bTaylor and Francis, _c2013.
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aApplied economics letters _vVolume 20, number 3
520	3		_aThis article investigates the relationship between management voluntary disclosures of cash flow forecasts and external financing policy, earnings management, earnings forecasts and executive stock option compensation. We find that management is more likely to issue cash flow forecasts when a firm has external financing needs or when a firm has more executive stock option compensation. However, management is less likely to disclose cash flow forecasts when a firm has more earnings management. Consistent with the prior research, we document that a firm with high dividend payout, large asset value and high profitability tends to disclose cash flow information to convey good news. Further, if analysts have released earning forecasts, management is likely to issue cash flow forecasts to complement those analyst earnings forecasts. If analysts release cash flow forecasts, management is less likely to disclose cash flow forecasts to avoid issuing repeat forecasts. Our results, therefore, suggest that different incentives drive management disclosure decisions regarding cash flow forecasts in actual practice.
650			_aExternal financing _vExecutive stock options _xCashflow forecasts
700	1		_aLiao, Woody M _eco author
700	1		_aLiu, Yen - Yu _eco author
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2012.689108
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c162774 _d162774