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040 _aMSU
_cMSU
_erda
100 _aSwanton, Christine
_eauthor
245 _aHeideggerian Environmental Virtue Ethics
_ccreated by Christine Swanton
264 _aMemphis
_bSpringer
_c2009
336 _2rdacontent
_atext
_btxt
337 _2rdamedia
_aunmediated
_bn
338 _2rdacarrier
_avolume
_bnc
440 _vVolume , number ,
520 _aEnvironmental ethics is apparently caught in a dilemma. We believe in human species partiality as a way of making sense of many of our practices. However as part of our commitment to impartialism in ethics, we arguably should extend the principle of impartiality to other species, in a version of biocentric egalitarianism of the kind advocated by Paul Taylor. According to this view, not only do all entities that possess a good have inherent worth, but they have equal inherent worth, and in particular no species is superior to any other. In this paper, I elaborate a Heideggerian environmental virtue ethics that slips between the horns of the dilemma. Central to this ethics is the relation of “dwelling” and the many virtues of dwelling, according to which the world is seen as “holy” in a variety of ways. This ethics is importantly local in respect of time and place, but also has universalistic aspects. To understand such an ethics, it is necessary to grasp Heidegger’s notion of truth as “aleithia” or opening, which enables us to escape the metaphysical dilemmas besetting ethics in the analytic tradition, including standard virtue ethics. Elaborating this notion occupies a large part of the paper.
650 _aVirtue
650 _aVirtue ethics
650 _aHeidegger
856 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-009-9186-1
942 _2lcc
_cJA
999 _c160477
_d160477