000			01919nam a22002417a 4500
003			ZW-GwMSU
005			20221116123300.0
008			221116b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aMSU _cMSU _erda
100			_aSwanton, Christine _eauthor
245			_aHeideggerian Environmental Virtue Ethics _ccreated by Christine Swanton
264			_aMemphis _bSpringer _c2009
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_vVolume , number ,
520			_aEnvironmental ethics is apparently caught in a dilemma. We believe in human species partiality as a way of making sense of many of our practices. However as part of our commitment to impartialism in ethics, we arguably should extend the principle of impartiality to other species, in a version of biocentric egalitarianism of the kind advocated by Paul Taylor. According to this view, not only do all entities that possess a good have inherent worth, but they have equal inherent worth, and in particular no species is superior to any other. In this paper, I elaborate a Heideggerian environmental virtue ethics that slips between the horns of the dilemma. Central to this ethics is the relation of “dwelling” and the many virtues of dwelling, according to which the world is seen as “holy” in a variety of ways. This ethics is importantly local in respect of time and place, but also has universalistic aspects. To understand such an ethics, it is necessary to grasp Heidegger’s notion of truth as “aleithia” or opening, which enables us to escape the metaphysical dilemmas besetting ethics in the analytic tradition, including standard virtue ethics. Elaborating this notion occupies a large part of the paper.
650			_aVirtue
650			_aVirtue ethics
650			_aHeidegger
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-009-9186-1
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c160477 _d160477