000			01936nam a22002417a 4500
003			ZW-GwMSU
005			20221111132038.0
008			221111b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aMSU _cMSU _erda
100			_aLeuven, Joost _eauthor
245			_aRyder’s Painism and His Criticism of Utilitarianism _ccreated by Joost Leuven & Tatjana Višak
264			_aNetherlands _bSpringerlink _c2012
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_vVolume , number ,
520			_aAs a member of the British Oxford Group, psychologist Richard Ryder marked the beginning of the modern animal rights and animal welfare movement in the seventies. By introducing the concept “speciesism.” Ryder contributed importantly to the expansion of this movement. Surprisingly little attention has been paid to Ryder’s moral theory, “painism”, that aims to resolve the conflict between the two predominant rival theories in animal ethics, the deontological of Tom Regan and the utilitarian of Peter Singer. First, this paper examines the kernel and historical sources of Ryder’s painist theory, linking it to the work of John Rawls and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Second, it examines Ryder’s critique of utilitarianism. It is argued that his critique of Singer’s use of the word “sentience” is unconvincing and that his critique of utilitarian aggregation as not taking a full account of the metaphysical separateness of persons, has already been countered and dealt with. Finally this paper looks at some of the counterintuitive implications of Ryder’s theory and argues that utilitarianism might have more resources for dealing with its own alleged counterintuitive implications than Ryder acknowledges.
650			_aRichard Ryder
650			_apainism
650			_aanimal ethics
856			_u10.1007s/10806-01293813
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c160373 _d160373