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040			_aMSU _cMSU _erda _bEnglish
050	0	0	_aHD5706 JOU
100	1		_aGoodman, Sarena F. _eauthor
245	1	4	_aThe design of teacher incentive pay and educational outcomes: _bevidence from New York City bonus program/ _ccreated by Sarena Goodman F.
264	1		_aChicago: _bUniversity of Chicago Press, _c2013.
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aJournal of labor economics _vVolume 31 , number 1,part 1.
520	3		_aTeacher compensation schemes are often criticized for lacking a performance-based component. Proponents argue that teacher incentive pay can raise student achievement and stimulate system-wide innovation. We examine a group-based teacher incentive scheme implemented in New York City and investigate whether specific features of the program contributed to its ineffectiveness. Although overall the program had little effect on student achievement, we show that in schools where incentives to free ride were weakest, the program led to small increases in math achievement. Our results underscore the importance of carefully considering the design of teacher incentive pay programs.
650			_aAchievement gap _vEducational reform _xEconomics of education
700	1		_aTurner, Lesley J. _eco author
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1086/668676
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c157644 _d157644