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| 005 | 20211021105400.0 | ||
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| 040 |
_aMSU _cMSU _erda |
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| 100 | 1 |
_aJacob Brian A _eAuthor |
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| 245 | 1 | 4 |
_aThe effect of employment protection on Teacher effort _cBrian A. Jacobs |
| 264 |
_aChicago: _bUniversity of Chicago, _c2013 |
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| 336 |
_2rdacontent _atext _btxt |
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| 337 |
_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn |
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| 338 |
_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc |
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| 440 |
_aJournal of Labor Economics _vVolume 31 , number 4 , |
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| 520 | _aIn 2004, the Chicago Public Schools and the Chicago Teachers Union signed a new collective bargaining agreement that gave principals the flexibility to dismiss probationary teachers (those with fewer than 5 years of experience) for any reason and without the hearing process typical in many urban districts. Results suggest that the policy reduced annual teacher absences by roughly 10% and reduced the incidence of frequent absences by 25%. The majority of the effect was due to changes in the composition of teachers in the district, although there is evidence of modest incentive effects for young untenured teachers. | ||
| 856 | _uhttps://doi.org/10.1086/669942 | ||
| 942 |
_2lcc _cJA |
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| 999 |
_c157614 _d157614 |
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