| 000 | 01597nam a22002537a 4500 | ||
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| 003 | ZW-GwMSU | ||
| 005 | 20210413151029.0 | ||
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| 022 | _a0148-558X | ||
| 040 |
_aMSU _cMSU _erda |
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| 100 | 1 |
_aBertomeu, Jeremy _eauthor |
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| 245 |
_aEconomic consequences of equity compensation disclosure/ _cJeremy Bertomeu |
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| 264 |
_aThousand Oaks, Califonia: _bSage, _c2012. |
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| 336 |
_2rdacontent _atext _btxt |
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| 337 |
_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn |
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| 338 |
_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc |
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| 440 |
_aJournal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance _vVolume 27 , number 4 , |
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| 520 | _aThe primary role of equity compensation is to provide incentives to an effort-averse agent. Here, the author shows that the chosen level of equity incentives, when publicly disclosed, will also convey information about future earnings, causing two-way linkages between incentive compensation, and financial reporting. If (a) market prices respond more (less) to information, (b) the manager is more (less) risk averse, or (c) earnings are more (less) noisy, then the firm’s owners choose more pronounced (muted) incentives, in turn leading to greater (lower) future earnings. The model explains observed spurious correlations between firm performance and executive compensation, and it provides several new predictions linking managerial, earnings, and market determinants to optimal equity holdings. | ||
| 650 | 4 | _aExecutive compensation | |
| 650 | 4 | _aDisclosure | |
| 650 | 4 | _aIncentives | |
| 856 | _uhttps://doi.org/10.1177/0148558X11409161 | ||
| 942 |
_2lcc _cJA |
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| 999 |
_c156523 _d156523 |
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