000			01623nam a22002777a 4500
003			ZW-GwMSU
005			20210412155349.0
008			210412b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a2169-7221
040			_aMSU _cMSU _erda
100	1		_aLuo Hong _eauthor
245	1	4	_aThe monitoring role of media on executive compensation/ _cHong Luo
264			_aTaylor and Francis: _bOxon, _c2013.
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_vVolume , number ,
520			_aThis paper investigates the monitoring role of media on executive compensation. Using data on media coverage from 2007 to 2009, we find that the media can serve as an effective external monitoring mechanism on executive compensation by affecting executive reputation. Specifically, negative media coverage and government intervention on media can enhance the monitoring role of media. We also find that the monitoring role of media and the market reaction to media coverage are stronger for non-state-owned corporations. Although the monitoring role of media is not different between monopolistic and non-monopolistic industries, the market reaction to media coverage is stronger for companies in non-monopolistic industries. We also find that there is less coverage on monopolistic and state-owned companies.
650			_aReputation mechanism
650			_aMedia coverage
650			_aExecutive compensation
700	1		_aLiu Baohua _eauthor
700	1		_aZhang Weiqian _eauthor
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1080/21697221.2013.802974
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c156507 _d156507