Discretionary Accruals Quality,Cost of Capital, and Diversification/ Sebahattin Demirkan
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- 0148-558
Item type | Current library | Call number | Vol info | Copy number | Status | Notes | Date due | Barcode | |
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Main Library - Special Collections | HF5601 JOU (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Vol 27, No 4 pages 496-527 | SP15201 | Not for loan | For In-house use only |
This study examines the discretionary accruals quality of single- and multiple-segment firms. The authors hypothesize and find that the discretionary accruals quality is lower for multiple-segment firms than single-segment firms, and for the same level of discretionary accruals quality, the cost of capital is higher for multiple-segment firms than single-segment firms. These findings suggest that more severe agency problems in multiple-segment firms compared with single-segment firms may lead to poor discretionary accruals quality and agency risk is priced-in as a higher cost of capital.
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