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Moral Hazard in Leasing Contracts: evidence from the New York City Taxi Industry created by Henry Schneider

By: Material type: TextTextSeries: Journal of Law and Economics ; Volume 53, number 4Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010Content type:
  • text
Media type:
  • unmediated
Carrier type:
  • volume
ISSN:
  • 00222186
Subject(s): LOC classification:
  • HB73 JOU
Online resources: Abstract: In this study, I investigate the effects of moral hazard in leasing contracts by examining the driving outcomes of all long-term lessees and owner-operators of New York City taxis. I find that moral hazard explains a sizable fraction of lessees’ accidents, driving violations, and vehicle inspection failures. To address the possibility of endogenous contract choice, I conduct an instrumental variables analysis of the cross section of all drivers and a panel-data analysis of a subset of drivers who switched from leasing to owning
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Holdings
Item type Current library Call number Vol info Copy number Status Notes Date due Barcode
Journal Article Journal Article Main Library - Special Collections HB73 JOU (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Vol. 53, no.4 (pages 783-806) SP9167 Not for loan For In House Use Only

In this study, I investigate the effects of moral hazard in leasing contracts by examining the driving outcomes of all long-term lessees and owner-operators of New York City taxis. I find that moral hazard explains a sizable fraction of lessees’ accidents, driving violations, and vehicle inspection failures. To address the possibility of endogenous contract choice, I conduct an instrumental variables analysis of the cross section of all drivers and a panel-data analysis of a subset of drivers who switched from leasing to owning

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