Does monitoring affect corruption? Career concerns and home bias in football refereeing
Material type:
- text
- unmediated
- volume
- 13504851
- HB1.A666 APP
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Item type | Current library | Call number | Vol info | Copy number | Status | Notes | Date due | Barcode | |
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Main Library - Special Collections | HB1.A666 APP (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Vol. 20, no. 8 (pages 728-731) | SP17975 | Not for loan | For In House Use Only |
This article evaluates refereeing bias in football games. Using a data set for Brazilian Championship, we find that referees systematically favour home teams setting more extra time in close matches in which home teams are behind. Career concerns seem to be relevant, since monitoring inhibits this behaviour and the effect of the refereeing bias on the probability of scoring in the extra time is quantitatively negligible.
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