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Do antitrust agencies facilitate meetings in smoke-filled rooms? created by Iwan Bos , Ronald Peeters and Erik Pot

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: Applied economics letters ; Volume 20, number 5New York: Taylor and Francis, 2013Content type:
  • text
Media type:
  • unmediated
Carrier type:
  • volume
ISSN:
  • 13504851
Subject(s): LOC classification:
  • HB1.A666 APP
Online resources: Abstract: This article identifies a potential adverse effect of antitrust enforcement. We show that if tacit collusion is not sustainable, firms are able and willing to collude explicitly when demand is viscous, the expected antitrust penalty is limited and antitrust agencies are sufficiently effective in catching cartels.
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Holdings
Item type Current library Call number Vol info Copy number Status Notes Date due Barcode
Journal Article Journal Article Main Library Journal Article HB1.A666 APP (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Vol. 20, no. 5 (pages 611-614) SP17976 Not for loan For In House Use Only

This article identifies a potential adverse effect of antitrust enforcement. We show that if tacit collusion is not sustainable, firms are able and willing to collude explicitly when demand is viscous, the expected antitrust penalty is limited and antitrust agencies are sufficiently effective in catching cartels.

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