Technical efficiency and the vertical boundaries of the firm theory and evidence
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Item type | Current library | Call number | Vol info | Status | Notes | Date due | Barcode | |
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Main Library - Special Collections | HB1.A666 APP (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Vol.20 , No.16 - 18 (Dec 2013) | Not for loan | For In House Use Only |
This article provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the relationship between firms’ technical efficiency and the vertical organization of production. Technical inefficiency is explicitly introduced as the source of firms’ heterogeneity in a Bertrand–Nash model of industry competition: the main prediction of the model is that the most efficient firms choose vertical integrated structures and the less-efficient ones choose disintegrated structures. The empirical part of the article rests on a stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) in a sample of about 400 Italian machine tool (MT) builders, and the result supports the prediction of the theoretical model.
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