Internal promotion and external recruitment: A theoretical and empirical analysis/ created by Jed De Varo
Material type:
- text
- unmediated
- volume
- 0734306X
- HD5706 JOU
Item type | Current library | Call number | Vol info | Copy number | Status | Notes | Date due | Barcode | |
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Main Library - Special Collections | HD5706 JOU (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Vol. 31, no.2 (pages 227-270) | SP17580 | Not for loan | For In-house use only |
We present a theoretical and empirical analysis of internal promotion versus external recruitment, using a job-assignment model involving competing firms with heterogeneous productivities and two-level job hierarchies with one managerial position. The model predicts that, controlling for the number of managers, increasing the number of lower-level workers is associated with (1) greater internal promotion as opposed to external recruitment, (2) higher profit, and (3) more general training. Empirical analysis of a large cross section of British employers is consistent with these predictions.
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