Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods created by Diego Moreno and María José Moscoso
Material type:
- text
- unmediated
- volume
- 09382259
- HB119 ECO
Item type | Current library | Call number | Vol info | Copy number | Status | Notes | Date due | Barcode | |
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Main Library - Special Collections | HB119 ECO (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Vol. 52, no.1 (pages 315-336) | SP21038 | Not for loan | For in house use only |
We show that strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods are dictatorial—i.e., they always select an allocation in their range that maximizes the welfare of the same single individual (the dictator). Further, strategy-proof and efficient allocation mechanisms are strongly dictatorial—i.e., they select the dictator's preferred allocation on the entire feasible set. Thus, our results reveal the extent to which the conflict between individual incentives and other properties that may be deemed desirable (e.g., fairness, equal treatment, distributive justice) pervades resource allocation problems.
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