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Wage dispersion and decentralization of wage bargaining/ created by Christian M. Dahl, Daniel le Maire and Jakob R. Munch

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: Journal of labor economics ; Volume 31, Number 3Chicago: Chicago University, 2013Content type:
  • text
Media type:
  • unmediated
Carrier type:
  • volume
ISSN:
  • 0734306X
Subject(s): Online resources: Abstract: This paper studies how decentralization of wage bargaining from sector to firm-level influences wage levels and wage dispersion. We use detailed panel data covering a period of decentralization in the Danish labor market. The decentralization process provides variation in the individual worker's wage-setting system that facilitates identification of the effects of decentralization. We find a wage premium associated with firm-level bargaining relative to sector-level bargaining, and that the return to skills is higher under the more decentralized wage-setting systems. Using quantile regression, we also find that wages are more dispersed under firm-level bargaining compared to more centralized wage-setting systems.
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Item type Current library Call number Vol info Copy number Status Notes Date due Barcode
Journal Article Journal Article Main Library - Special Collections HD5706 JOU (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Vol. 31, no.3 (pages 501-533) SP17576 Not for loan For In House Use Only

This paper studies how decentralization of wage bargaining from sector to firm-level influences wage levels and wage dispersion. We use detailed panel data covering a period of decentralization in the Danish labor market. The decentralization process provides variation in the individual worker's wage-setting system that facilitates identification of the effects of decentralization. We find a wage premium associated with firm-level bargaining relative to sector-level bargaining, and that the return to skills is higher under the more decentralized wage-setting systems. Using quantile regression, we also find that wages are more dispersed under firm-level bargaining compared to more centralized wage-setting systems.

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