Conflicts, interest groups, and politics in structural reforms created by Avi Ben-Bassat
Material type:
- text
- unmediated
- volume
- 00222186
- HB73 JOU
Item type | Current library | Call number | Vol info | Copy number | Status | Notes | Date due | Barcode | |
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Main Library - Special Collections | HB73 JOU (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Vol. 54 no.4 part 1 (pages 937-952) | SP12291 | Not for loan | For In House Use Only |
The present study is, to my knowledge, the first to examine the balance of power among all players influencing the adoption of structural reforms: politicians, regulators, and interest groups. Special attention is devoted to the effect of conflicts between regulators. Professional conflicts signal to politicians that there is a high level of risk in implementing a given reform, thereby weakening their confidence in it. Conflicts also benefit interest groups, increasing their effectiveness vis-à-vis politicians. Using a unique data set on 32 attempts to reform Israel’s financial market, I find that the greater the extent of conflicts among regulators and the greater the intensity of the opposition of interest groups, the lower the probability that a reform will be approved. These conflicts, together with the strength of interest groups, have led to repeated attempts to introduce reforms, so that it takes, on average, 10 years for a reform to be adopted
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