The media and discretionary behaviour of bureaucrats
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Item type | Current library | Call number | Vol info | Status | Notes | Date due | Barcode | |
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Main Library - Special Collections | HB1.A666 APP (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Vol.20 , No.10 - 12 (Aug 2013) | Not for loan | For In House Use Only |
Due to the public good character of protective measures against natural disasters, their allocation is very often in the realm of bureaucratic and expert agencies. I analysed the effect of negative media reports on a bureaucratic agency's output decisions by applying a Vector Autoregression (VAR) model on annual data of the US Army Corps of Engineers' (USACE) spending on flood protection from 1968 to 2008. The results showed that the negative media reports about the agency subsequently increase formal output.
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