Why do state owned enterprises over-invest?Government intervention or managerial entrenchment. Created by Jan Bai
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Item type | Current library | Call number | Vol info | Copy number | Status | Notes | Date due | Barcode | |
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Main Library - Special Collections | HF5601 CHI (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | vol1,no 3-4,pages 236 | SP18461 | Not for loan | For in-house use only |
In a transition economy, corporate investment decisions are affected not only by managerial discretion, but also by government intervention. Using the data of publicly listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China, we investigate how government intervention and corporate managerial entrenchment affect over-investment. The results show that both the policy burden from government intervention and rent-seeking due to managerial entrenchment can lead to over-investments, and these two effects appear to be complementary to each other. With a weak government intervention, managerial discretion is greater and management behavior tends toward opportunism.
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