Midlands State University Library
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Management of knowledge workers by Hans K. Hvide and Eirik Gaard Kristiansen

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: Journal of law and economics ; Volume 55, number 4Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 2012Content type:
  • text
Media type:
  • unmediated
Carrier type:
  • volume
ISSN:
  • 00222186
Subject(s): LOC classification:
  • HB73 JOU
Online resources: Summary: We study how firm-specific complementary assets and intellectual property rights affect the management of knowledge workers. The main results show when a firm will wish to sue workers who leave with innovative ideas and the effects of complementary assets on wages and on worker initiative. We show that firms protected weakly by complementary assets must sue leaving workers in order to obtain positive profits. Moreover, firms with more complementary assets pay higher wages and have lower rates of turnover, but the higher pay has a detrimental effect on worker initiative. Finally, our analysis suggests that strengthening firms’ property rights protection reduces turnover costs but weakens worker initiative.
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Holdings
Item type Current library Call number Vol info Copy number Status Notes Date due Barcode
Journal Article Journal Article Main Library - Special Collections HB73 JOU (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Vol. 55, no.4 (pages 815-838) SP15116 Not for loan For In House Use Only

We study how firm-specific complementary assets and intellectual property rights affect the management of knowledge workers. The main results show when a firm will wish to sue workers who leave with innovative ideas and the effects of complementary assets on wages and on worker initiative. We show that firms protected weakly by complementary assets must sue leaving workers in order to obtain positive profits. Moreover, firms with more complementary assets pay higher wages and have lower rates of turnover, but the higher pay has a detrimental effect on worker initiative. Finally, our analysis suggests that strengthening firms’ property rights protection reduces turnover costs but weakens worker initiative.

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