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Redistributive taxation and personal bankruptcy in U.S. States/ created by Charles Grant and Winfried Koeniger

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: Journal of Law and Economics ; Volume 52, number 3Publisher: Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 2009Content type:
  • text
Media type:
  • unmediated
Carrier type:
  • volume
ISSN:
  • 00222186
Subject(s): LOC classification:
  • HB73 JOU
Online resources: Summary: Personal bankruptcy regulation and redistributive taxes and transfers vary considerably across U.S. states and over time. Our hypothesis is that both policies are imperfect substitutes in insuring consumption of risk‐averse agents in incomplete markets. Exploiting data variation over time for 18 U.S. states for the period 1980-2003, we find considerable support for this hypothesis: redistributive taxation and bankruptcy exemptions are negatively correlated, and both policies are associated with more equal consumption growth
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Holdings
Item type Current library Call number Vol info Copy number Status Notes Date due Barcode
Journal Article Journal Article Main Library - Special Collections HB73 JOU (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Vol. 52, no.3 (pages 445-468) SP4269 Not for loan For In House Use Only

Personal bankruptcy regulation and redistributive taxes and transfers vary considerably across U.S. states and over time. Our hypothesis is that both policies are imperfect substitutes in insuring consumption of risk‐averse agents in incomplete markets. Exploiting data variation over time for 18 U.S. states for the period 1980-2003, we find considerable support for this hypothesis: redistributive taxation and bankruptcy exemptions are negatively correlated, and both policies are associated with more equal consumption growth

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