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Mutual Fund Exit and Mutual Fund Fees by Philip C. English II, Ilhan Demiralp and William P. Dukes

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: The Journal of Law and Economics ; Volume 54, number 3Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 2011Content type:
  • text
Media type:
  • unmediated
Carrier type:
  • volume
ISSN:
  • 00222186
Subject(s): LOC classification:
  • HB73 JOU
Online resources: Summary: We examine the effect of mutual fund fee structure on mutual fund exit mode and timing. The evidence presented herein is consistent with fee maximization by mutual fund sponsors or managers, increased conflicts of interest for funds charging 12b-1 fees and higher management fees, and a pecking order for mutual fund exit method. Specifically, mutual fund exits that result in decreased fee income are delayed relative to exits that do not and exit strategies that retain fee income are more likely than strategies that do not
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Holdings
Item type Current library Call number Vol info Copy number Status Notes Date due Barcode
Journal Article Journal Article Main Library - Special Collections HB73 JOU (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Vol. 54, no.3 (pages 723-750) SP12292 Not for loan For In House Use Only

We examine the effect of mutual fund fee structure on mutual fund exit mode and timing. The evidence presented herein is consistent with fee maximization by mutual fund sponsors or managers, increased conflicts of interest for funds charging 12b-1 fees and higher management fees, and a pecking order for mutual fund exit method. Specifically, mutual fund exits that result in decreased fee income are delayed relative to exits that do not and exit strategies that retain fee income are more likely than strategies that do not

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