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What do revolving-door laws do? created by Marc T. Law and Cheryl X. Long

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: Journal of Law and Economics ; Volume 55, number 2Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 2012Content type:
  • text
Media type:
  • unmediated
Carrier type:
  • volume
ISSN:
  • 00222186
Subject(s): LOC classification:
  • HB73 JOU
Online resources: Abstract: On the basis of evidence from state public utility commissions, we find that revolving-door laws—laws that restrict the post-government-employment opportunities of public sector workers, including public utility regulators—do not do much, at least with respect to electricity prices. In this paper, we take advantage of a quasi experiment afforded by the fact that revolving-door laws were introduced in different states at different times to investigate their effects on electricity prices. Our findings suggest that while revolving-door laws temporarily dampen industrial electricity prices, they have no effect on commercial or residential prices. There is also some evidence that these regulations affect the characteristics of state public utility commissioners; commissioners from states with revolving-door regulations serve shorter terms and are less likely to be subsequently employed in the private sector, compared with their counterparts from states without revolving-door laws.
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Item type Current library Call number Vol info Copy number Status Notes Date due Barcode
Journal Article Journal Article Main Library - Special Collections HB73 JOU (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Vol. 55, no.3 (pages 421-436) SP13851 Not for loan For In House Use Only

On the basis of evidence from state public utility commissions, we find that revolving-door laws—laws that restrict the post-government-employment opportunities of public sector workers, including public utility regulators—do not do much, at least with respect to electricity prices. In this paper, we take advantage of a quasi experiment afforded by the fact that revolving-door laws were introduced in different states at different times to investigate their effects on electricity prices. Our findings suggest that while revolving-door laws temporarily dampen industrial electricity prices, they have no effect on commercial or residential prices. There is also some evidence that these regulations affect the characteristics of state public utility commissioners; commissioners from states with revolving-door regulations serve shorter terms and are less likely to be subsequently employed in the private sector, compared with their counterparts from states without revolving-door laws.

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