TY  - BOOK
AU  - Riboni,Alessandro
TI  - Ideology and endogenous constitutions
SN  - 09382259
AV  - HB119 ECO 
PY  - 2013///
CY  - Berlin
PB  - Springer
KW  - Majority rule
KW  - Position-taking preferences
KW  - Ideological polarization
KW  - Strategic interactions
KW  - Agenda-setting game
N2  - We study a legislature where decisions are made by playing an agenda-setting game. Legislators are concerned about their electoral prospects but they are also genuinely concerned for the legislature to make the correct decision. We show that when ideological polarization is positive but not too large (and the status quo is extremely inefficient), institutions in which the executive has either no constraints (autocracy) or many constraints (unanimity) are preferable to democracies that operate under an intermediate number of constraints (simple majority rule). When instead ideological polarization is large (and the status quo is only moderately inefficient), simple majority turns out to be preferable
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0668-9
ER  -