TY  - BOOK
AU  - Ben Basaṭ,Avi
TI  - Conflicts, interest groups, and politics in structural reforms
SN  - 00222186
AV  - HB73 JOU 
PY  - 2011///
CY  - Chicago
PB  - University of Chicago Press
KW  - Banking reforms
KW  - Economic reform
KW  - Financial markets
KW  - Government intervention
KW  - Government reform
KW  - Macroeconomic reform
KW  - Political interest groups
KW  - Political reform
KW  - Politicians
N2  - The present study is, to my knowledge, the first to examine the balance of power among all players influencing the adoption of structural reforms: politicians, regulators, and interest groups. Special attention is devoted to the effect of conflicts between regulators. Professional conflicts signal to politicians that there is a high level of risk in implementing a given reform, thereby weakening their confidence in it. Conflicts also benefit interest groups, increasing their effectiveness vis-à-vis politicians. Using a unique data set on 32 attempts to reform Israel’s financial market, I find that the greater the extent of conflicts among regulators and the greater the intensity of the opposition of interest groups, the lower the probability that a reform will be approved. These conflicts, together with the strength of interest groups, have led to repeated attempts to introduce reforms, so that it takes, on average, 10 years for a reform to be adopted
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1086/658672
ER  -