TY  - BOOK
AU  - Seldeslachts,Jo
AU  - Clougherty,  Joseph A.
AU  - Barros,  Pedro Pita
TI  - Settle for Now but Block for Tomorrow: the Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy Tools
SN  - 00222186
AV  - HB73 JOU 
PY  - 2009///
CY  - Chicago
PB  - University of Chicago Press
KW  - Antitrust
KW  - Antitrust policy
KW  - Behavior deterrence
KW  - Estimation methods
KW  - Instrumental variables estimation
KW  - Insurance settlements
KW  - Jurisdiction
KW  - Linear regression
KW  - Stock markets
N2  - Antitrust policy involves not just the regulation of anticompetitive behavior but also an important deterrence effect. Neither scholars nor policy makers have fully researched the deterrence effects of merger policy tools because they have been unable to empirically measure these effects. We consider the ability of different antitrust actions—blocked mergers, negotiated settlements, and monitorings—to deter firms from engaging in mergers. We use cross‐jurisdiction/pantime data on merger policy to empirically estimate the impact of antitrust actions on future merger frequencies. We find that blocked mergers lead to decreased merger notifications in subsequent periods and that negotiated settlements weakly increase future merger notifications; in other words, blocked mergers involve a deterrence effect, but negotiated settlements do not
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1086/596038
ER  -