TY  - BOOK
AU  - Pecorino, Paul
AU  - Boening, Mark Van
TI  - Fairness in an Embedded Ultimatum Game
SN  - 00222186
AV  - HB73 JOU 
PY  - 2011///
CY  - Chicago
PB  - University of Chicago Press
KW  - Central tendencies
KW  - Defendants
KW  - Fairness
KW  - Null hypothesis
KW  - Plaintiffs
KW  - Risk aversion
KW  - Statistical median
KW  - Surplus
KW  - Trials
N2  - We embed an ultimatum game in a stylized legal bargaining framework. This changes the framing of the standard ultimatum game in several ways but also moves the bargaining closer to what is found in some naturally occurring settings. In this context, the ultimatum game is played over the joint surplus, which is achieved from settlement rather than a dispute. In our embedded ultimatum game, the median offer contains only 8 percent of the joint surplus from settlement. When we replicate the simple ultimatum game, we find that 50 percent of the joint surplus is contained in the median offer
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1086/599622
ER  -