TY  - BOOK
AU  - Chen,Zhijun
AU  - Rey, Patrick
TI  - On the design of leniency programs
SN  - 00222186
AV  - HB73 JOU 
PY  - 2013///
CY  - Chicago
PB  - University of Chicago Press
KW  - Cartel
KW  - Leniency Program
KW  - Antitrust
N2  - Leniency programs contribute to destabilizing collusion but can also be abused and generate perverse effects. This paper develops a simple model capturing this trade-off, which we use to relate the optimal leniency policy (the carrot) to the effectiveness of investigations (the stick). We show that it is always desirable to offer some leniency before an investigation is launched; it is also optimal to offer some leniency once an investigation is underway when investigations are unlikely to succeed in uncovering cartels, absent self-reporting. Our analysis also confirms the usefulness of restricting leniency to the first informant only; in contrast, it does not support prohibiting leniency for repeat offenders
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1086/674011
ER  -